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The contribution of this paper is twofold.  First, we use the administrative dataset of the Privatization 
Agency of Kosovo between 2003 and 2018 to analyze the factors affecting privatization prices. We 
identify the effects of five sets of variables: features of the auction process; Privatization Agency-related 
variables; buyer characteristics; asset characteristics; and election-related variables. Second, beyond this 
econometric investigation, we explore the complexities of the privatization process in Kosovo, in 
particular the Kosovo-specific factors that may have influenced the prices of privatized enterprises and 
assets. Policy implications suggest measures to enhance the credibility of the privatization process and 
related institutions. 
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Following the 1998-99 war and the departure of the Serbian army and administration, Kosovo was left 
with a shattered economy, severely damaged housing stock and infrastructure and virtually no established 
institutions. Kosovo became a UN protectorate administered by the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) according to the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1244. The process of reconstruction, particularly building the new institutional apparatus 
appropriate for a democratic market economy, including economic institutions, the legal system, law 
enforcement, banking, etc. began immediately after the war, supported by the UN, the EU and NATO. As 
in other transition economies (TEs), one of the most important elements of the transformation process was 
the privatization of socially owned enterprises. The process of privatization and in particular the choice of 
the method of privatization reflect the complexities arising from the nature of the ownership system in 




After much discussion and delay, it was decided that the auction method would be employed as the sole 
method of privatization. Enterprises were offered for sale (largely) to the highest bidder, a process which 
started in 2003 and is still continuing though the bulk of enterprises and assets have now completed the 
process. Although the privatization process in other TEs has been analyzed in great detail, there has been 
very little discussion of the process and its particularities in Kosovo. Also, although Kosovo is unique in 
employing auctions as the main privatization method, there has been no study of how prices of companies 
or assets were determined through the auction mechanism.  
The aim of this paper is to address these gaps in the literature by (i) exploring the complexities of the 
privatization process in Kosovo; and (ii) analyzing the factors affecting privatization prices in the 
particular conditions of Kosovo. By relying on the literature on the experiences of other countries using 
the auction method and the specific features of Kosovo’s transition, this study identifies five sets of 
factors that influence the auction prices: specific features of the auction process; characteristics of the 
assets being auctioned; the role of the privatization agency organizing the auctions; characteristics of 
buyers; and election related factors. It is important to find out the influence of these factors, particularly 
those that can be affected by policy makers, so as to maximize the revenue in the interest of creditors, 
employees and the state. 
                                                        
1 The UNSC Resolution 1244 formally ended Serbian rule in Kosovo with the establishment of the international protectorate. 
However, the Resolution did not change the borders of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, therefore, Kosovo remained 
formally part of Serbia until the declaration of independence in 2008.   
We use the complete administrative database of the Privatization Agency of Kosovo, covering the 
population of privatized assets in the 2003-2018 period. We identify the following positive influences on 
privatization prices: (i) the number of bidders; (ii) deposit requirements; (iii) the size of land and 
buildings; (iv) foreign investors; (v) belonging to the manufacturing sector; and (vi) being located in 
cities. Conversely, the following factors tend to lower auction prices: (i) sale later in the privatization 
program; and (ii) the duration of the sales process. In addition, although important national influences on 
privatization prices cannot be explicitly modeled in a single-country investigation, these are nonetheless 
extensively discussed: the poor state of socially owned enterprises and their assets; contentious ownership 
rights at the beginning of the process; the weak regulatory and institutional environment; and a 
privatization process designed to address political concerns of UNMIK officials. A major issue of concern 
in our regression analysis is the possibility that some of our main variables of interest may be 
endogenous. For this reason, we include an extended discussion of this issue before reporting our 
regression results. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two discusses the privatization process and its particular 
complexities in Kosovo. Section three reviews the literature and provides the analytical framework of the 
paper. Section four discusses the data, the empirical strategy and regression results, paying special 
attention to the issue of endogeneity. Section five reflects on the Kosovo-specific factors beyond the 
econometric analysis affecting privatization prices. Section six concludes the paper and offers brief policy 
recommendations.   
2. Privatization in Kosovo: the context 
In Kosovo, as in other parts of former Yugoslavia, enterprises were “socially owned” (as opposed to 
being “state owned”, typical of other socialist countries). Enterprises belonged to “society” but were 
entrusted to their employees to manage them on behalf of society and who were expected to maintain 
them and increase their values on a regular basis. Employees were the main beneficiary of enterprises; 
they decided on major issues affecting their enterprise and were responsible for the resource allocation 
process within their enterprise.
2
  
The former Yugoslavia was a federation of eight Republics and Autonomous Provinces that were 
responsible for their own political and socio-economic affairs and the supervision of the independent, 
                                                        
2 For detailed discussion of the social ownership in Yugoslavia and problems associated with it, see among others: Horvat (1982); 
Lydall (1984); Prout (1985); Hashi (1992); Stiglitz (1995); and Uvalić (1997, 2010). 
self- managed enterprises within their territories. The 1974 Constitution gave the eight constituent units of 
Yugoslavia equal status in the governance of the country as a whole. Although the two Autonomous 
Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, for all practical 
purposes they were independent of Serbia. Most importantly, any change in the constitutional 
arrangements in Serbia or its two Autonomous Provinces required the agreement of the Assemblies 
(parliaments) of not just Serbia but also of the two Provinces.
3
 
In 1989, Serbia managed to annul Kosovo’s autonomy, abolishing its autonomous institutions and taking 
control of the government, institutions and enterprises. Using laws passed as “temporary measures”, it 
dismissed the majority of Albanian employees and effectively ended the system of self-management in 
Kosovo. In the following decade Kosovo’s economy suffered seriously from lack of investment (indeed, 
disinvestment), shortage of high skilled employees, and general mismanagement. During this period, 
shares of many enterprises were transferred to entities in Serbia (usually creditor banks, companies or 
institutions), something which later contributed to the complexities of the privatization process in Kosovo 
(see for example the case of the Trepça Mining and Metallurgical Complex in Palairet, 2002). 
While assigning clearly defined property rights was the principal argument for privatization in former 
Socialist countries (Stiglitz, 1995), in the case of Kosovo the ambiguity of social ownership, and the 
transformations of enterprises by Serbian authorities during the 1990s, raised two critical questions: first, 
who had the authority to sell the socially owned property – enterprises, employees, or the state (and which 
state, Kosovo or Serbia); and, second, who was entitled to the proceeds from privatization (the enterprise, 
the employees or the state)? The international community was concerned that the ambiguities of social 
ownership and the decade of Serbia’s active involvement in the SOE sector in Kosovo, which resulted in 
Serbian entities having claims against Kosovo enterprises, may generate future claims against the new 
owners of Kosovo’s SOEs. They were also afraid that the sale of Kosovo’s SOEs may make international 
officials and institutions liable for these claims.  
Of course, to some extent, the international community was overcautious as other parts of former 
Yugoslavia (including a few enterprises in Kosovo itself) had already embarked on the privatization 
process, initially under the Law on Social Capital (1988 and 1989), better known as the Marković Law, 
and later through their own privatization laws and regulations. The process of privatization (or ownership 
                                                        
3 Numerous articles of the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia (for example Articles 2, 4, 5, 171, 246, 321 and 398, and 
Constitutional Amendments III, IV and XLI) emphasize the autonomous nature and self-management rights of autonomous 
provinces and their equality with the republics (see Jogoslovenski Pregled, 1989).     
transformation) could be initiated by either enterprises themselves or the state and it was also clear that 
both employees and the state were to benefit from the process.
4
  
After two years of deliberation, and faced with the reality that enterprises’ conditions were deteriorating 
by the day, the UNMIK administration decided on a particular method of privatization, direct sale to the 
highest bidder, and established the institutional framework to transform Kosovo SOEs into private 
enterprises.
5
 First, at the core of the privatization infrastructure was the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), 
which was established in 2002 as an independent body to ‘administer SOEs as a trustee for their owners’ 
and ‘carry out ancillary activities to preserve or enhance the value, viability and governance of SOEs’ – 
functions similar to those of privatization agencies in other TEs. The KTA was also given the authority to 
privatize SOEs, either as going concerns with a market value, or otherwise liquidate them and sell their 
individual assets. The rationale for the establishment of KTA was to sell SOEs and their property/assets, 
as it was quite obvious that further delays in the transfer of property rights to private investors would 
deplete further the already depleted stock of SOEs’ assets.
6
 Decades of mismanagement and 
underinvestment in SOEs, particularly in the 1990s, compounded by damage suffered during the war, had 
enormously reduced the value of enterprises in Kosovo. Hence, the aims of ‘enhancing of the value, 
viability and governance of SOEs’ could never be seriously pursued by the Agency. Second, the Special 
Chamber of the Supreme Court (SCSC) was established as the judicial authority with primary jurisdiction 
over the creditor and other claims against SOEs or the Agency.
7
  Finally, the proceeds from the sale of 
each SOE were to be placed in a Trust Fund (in the form of an Escrow account), with 20% of the sales 
revenue to be awarded to the former employees
8
 and the rest used to address creditors’ claims.
9
 In this 
                                                        
4 See Bayliss (2005); Cerović (2010); Franičević (1999); Gligorov (2004); Slaveski (1997); Uvalić (2010), among others.  
5 As a matter of fact, in the legislation pertaining to the transformation of social property in Kosovo there is no reference to 
privatization at all. The transformation is done under the notion of “administration” of SOEs (see UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 on 
the Establishment of the Kosovo Trust Agency (http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/ 
unmikgazette/02english/E2002regs/RE2002_12.pdf; accessed on: January 17, 2019).  KTA was also responsible for the ‘so-
called’ publicly owned enterprises (POEs), those offering public services (utilities, etc.). After 2008, by Law these enterprises 
were withdrawn from the Agency and put under the auspices of the Ministry of Economic Development.  
6 With the declaration of independence, the KTA was transformed into the Kosovo Privatization Agency (KPA) with largely the 
same mandate. Much of the current privatization infrastructure – legal and institutional – is similar to the one establishing KTA. 
Hence, the designation ‘Agency’ is used interchangeably for both the KTA and the KPA.     
7 The Special Chamber of the Supreme Court, and indeed the entire process of privatization, have had a heavy international 
involvement over the years. Eight out of 20 judges sitting on the SCSC were international until June 2018 when the change in the 
mandate of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) saw the withdrawal of international judges from this 
institution. Until September 2014, the Board of Directors of the Agency – the main decision making body – was comprised of 
members appointed by international bodies governing Kosovo as well as local representatives, with the former having the right to 
veto any Board decision. All this was done to preserve the credibility of the privatization process.          
8 The 20% rule was included as a compensation not for the loss of ownership rights, but for workers’ loss of self-management 
rights. 
9 Also, a portion of the proceeds, currently at 5%, would go towards maintaining the Agency’s operations.  
way, potential claims would be assessed and dealt with legally through the SCSC in accordance with the 
law, while UNMIK or its officials would not be liable for any future claims arising from privatization. 
During the period of governance by the KTA, the fate of the remaining funds after the employees had 
been paid and creditor claims settled, was not decided upon. Under current legislation, the remaining 
funds are to be transferred to the state budget for development projects.  
The method of privatization adopted by KTA was direct sale to the highest bidder through a sealed-bid 
auction. In other transition countries, a wide variety of privatization methods had been used (voucher 
privatization, management-employee buyout, stock market floatation, direct sale through negotiation with 
buyers as well as various combinations of these methods). The element of auction was present in some of 
these methods (Czech and Slovak voucher privatization, auction of small shops in various countries, etc.) 
but, in Kosovo, it was the only method of sale. The auction method was chosen on the basis of its speed, 
simplicity and the lower potential for corruption. A further consideration was that, in spite of generally 
low levels of income, low asset prices and the flow of remittances ensured that a large group of citizens 
could participate in the process. This method has been shown to be much more effective than, for 
example the mass privatization method adopted in many countries (Zinnes et al., 2001; Djankov & 
Murrell, 2002; Estrin et al., 2009). Privatization methods that resulted in concentrated rather than 
dispersed ownership led to deeper restructuring of privatized companies and better corporate governance 
arrangements. In addition, privatization to outside owners was more effective compared to sales to 
insiders. Furthermore, foreign investors have generally favored the direct sale method of privatization 
(Goldberg & Nellis, 2008) – although foreign investors did not actively participate in the process in 
Kosovo (largely because of the unresolved issue of Kosovo’s status in the early stages and the fear of 
potential claims from Serbia). 
The particular mechanism of offering companies for sale was the so-called “spin-off” arrangement. The 
Agency selected viable SOEs
10
 and converted each of them to one or more new limited liability 
companies.
11
 The new company inherited all the rights and interests of the old SOE but was not liable for 
its debts or claims against it. The liabilities remained with the old SOE which effectively became a shell 
                                                        
10 The ‘viability’ of SOEs was an important factor determining if an SOE would go into privatization in its current form. As 
Korovilas (2006) explains, the KTA defines an economically viable SOE as one which retains the capacity (i.e. it can utilize a 
significant proportion of its existing capital) to continue operating profitably in its original line of business. Hence, one would not 
define SOEs as economically viable if their production cannot be profitably resumed, either because there is no longer a market 
for the product or because the future profits from the SOE are not sufficient to justify the level of investment needed to overhaul 
the production process. 
11 SOEs were often converted into more than one new company as many of them were involved in several different unrelated 
activities with no clear advantage.   
company under the administration of the Agency. The Agency then offered the new companies (or 
individual assets) for sale in public tender auctions on a regular basis – a process that is still continuing. 
Unlike other countries where shares were auctioned, in Kosovo the company (100% of shares) was put up 
for auction as one item and sold to a single private investor – the highest bidder.
12
 The remaining assets 
of SOEs as well as non-viable SOEs would enter a voluntary liquidation process – which also involved 




Altogether, by 2018, around 520 SOEs with over 3,000 assets had entered the privatization process. So 
far, the break-up of 350 SOEs has given rise to some 750 new companies and 950 individual assets, 
which have been sold through either the spin-off procedure or voluntary liquidation. Of these new 
companies, 26 were privatized through special spin-offs (explained in footnote 13). The proceeds from 
privatization have amounted to around €660 million while the total cost of the process has been around 
€114 million. Over €120 million have been paid to creditors, while around €110 million have been 
distributed to former employees of SOEs. Transfers to the state budget exceed €170 million by the end of 
2018. 
Overall, the implementation of privatization through the auction method has to be viewed in the light of 
Kosovo’s post-war conditions and the emerging institutional framework. Indeed, it is likely that the weak 
institutional framework, under which the privatization was conducted over a decade and a half, 
significantly limited the overall impact of the process (Riinvest, 2008; Knudsen, 2010). Although the 
evidence for Kosovo is scarce, the literature on transition economies demonstrates that the success of 
privatization is conditional on the policy framework and the institutional development of the country (for 
recent discussion see Estrin & Pelletier, 2018). For instance, Estrin et al. (2009) find that when 
privatization was accompanied by complementary reforms it had a positive effect on the level of 
aggregate output. Zinnes et al. (2001) argue that success of privatization is conditional on improvements 
in prudential, regulatory, and budgetary institutions. Goldberg and Nellis (2008, p. 349) identify the 
                                                        
12 The legislation of privatization in Kosovo uses the notion of “tender” instead of “auction”. However, as “tender” is not a very 
common concept in auction literature, instead we will be using “auction” throughout the paper.   
13 While this simple “spin-off” mechanism was deemed sufficient for the bulk of Kosovar SOEs, a version of it, the “special spin-
off”, was used for larger strategic companies. In these cases, the buyer not only had to offer a price for the company but also had 
to undertake additional commitments such as maintaining the old SOE activity, committing to a minimum amount new 
investment, or retaining a minimum level of employment. Clearly, here, the criteria for choosing the best buyer involved not only 
the price they offered but the other commitments they made. The additional commitments were meant to ensure that the new 
owners of large enterprises would invest a minimum amount in revitalizing and modernizing their enterprise and maintain the 
level of employment for at least a certain period (usually about three year). As these companies were not privatized on the basis 
of their price, they are excluded from the empirical analysis. In addition, as the price of these companies was significantly higher 
than price of other companies or assets, their inclusion would also have distorted the econometric investigation. 
protection of property rights, effective regulatory agencies and a competent public administration as the 
institutions needed for successful privatization. 
On a final note, the PAK itself has not been devoid of the constraints typical of the institutional setting in 
Kosovo. Shortages of human and technical capacities have been prevalent. For many years, coordination 
with other institutions was almost non-existent. There are indications that the Agency has not been able to 
resist special interest groups, making it susceptible to corruption and rent-seeking (see Knudsen, 2010). 
Moreover, the performance of the Agency has been questioned as almost half of the SOE assets (in terms 
of number not value) are still awaiting the process of sale.  
3. Literature review and analytical framework 
Although the literature on privatization is vast, only a handful of studies have investigated the 
determinants of privatization prices. Even fewer have explored privatization prices in the transition 
context. A feature of these studies is the lack of a unified theoretical framework guiding their empirical 
investigations. The theoretical approach is rather eclectic, with auction theory – in conjunction with 
competition policy – providing the basis for determinants related to the auction process (Klemperer, 1999, 
2004; McAfee & McMillan, 1987; Milgrom, 1989) while other hypotheses draw on concepts developed 
in the transition literature, specifically related to the privatization process, industrial development and so 
forth (for discussion see López-de-Silanes, 1997; Shafik, 1994).           
Two early contributions investigate price determination under voucher privatization in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. Shafik (1994) analyses the relationship between information and price determination, 
while Claessens (1995) looks into the relationship between ownership structure and equity prices. The 
former study explores the impact of two sets of information on price variations of shares: the publicly 
available information on the enterprise’s past performance; and private or “insider” information on the 
enterprise’s prospects. He provides econometric evidence that historical data on the enterprise’s past 
performance explains less than one-third of the variation in price, especially in the early stages of 
privatization.
14
 The information on the enterprise’s future prospects – manifested through the bidding 
process – explains a much higher proportion of price variation. Other important findings suggest that high 
rates of profitability, location, and the presence of domestic and foreign strategic investors have positive 
                                                        
14 The remaining differences are attributed to the unofficial sources of information about enterprises' performance obtained prior 
or during the bidding process. 
effects on prices while, on the contrary, the number of employees has a significant negative effect on the 
prices.  
Claessens (1995), on the other hand, relates various indicators of the nature and concentration of 
ownership to the prices offered in the last bidding round or prices quoted in the secondary markets (e.g. 
stock exchange). The results show that higher prices are associated with a greater degree of concentration. 
In addition, as in Shafik (1994), the higher the equity share of strategic owners – domestic or foreign – the 
higher the price.   
More recent contributions study determinants of privatization prices in Mexico (López-de-Silanes, 1997), 
Turkey (Arin & Okten, 2003), and Brazil (Santos, 2016). López-de-Silanes (1997) – the most 
authoritative study on the subject – investigates the determinants of privatization prices on a sample of 
236 Mexican companies privatized between 1983 and 1992. Arin and Okten (2003) focus on 68 Turkish 
companies – largely in the cement sector – privatized between 1989 and 1998, while Santos (2016) 
utilizes a sample of 118 Brazilian companies privatized between 1991 and 2004. Broadly, to explain the 
factors that affect privatization prices, these empirical investigations rely on three sets of factors: namely, 
the impact of firm and industry-specific parameters; the auction process; and prior restructuring 
experience. The results are generally consistent across the three studies. First, in terms of the auction 
process, higher competition and the speed of sale are both associated with higher premiums (although, in 
Arin and Okten, 2003, the latter is statistically insignificant). In addition, limiting the participation of 
foreign investors in auction procedures reduces the price significantly.  
Secondly, regarding firm and industry-specific determinants, variables such as net income, capacity 
utilization, sales and industry features – e.g., whether state enterprises produce a larger proportion of an 
industry’s output – have a positive impact on net prices (although, in the case of Turkish companies, 
capacity utilization is statistically insignificant). Moreover, as in the case of companies in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, when the bidder(s) bid for a more concentrated stake in a company, the premiums are 
higher. Finally, contrary to widely held belief, most prior restructuring measures – such as, absorbing debt 
or implementing various efficiency-increasing programs – do not lead to higher prices. What is worse, the 
latter may even delay privatization of assets substantially. Lopez de Silanes (1997) and Santos (2016) 
conclude that measures to improve firms’ performance and voluntary labor downsizing schemes fail to 
raise prices, while restructuring measures – debt absorption and compulsory labor downsizing schemes – 
have a significant negative impact on net revenue from privatization. 
Compared to previous investigations on the determination of privatization prices, our study is narrower in 
range as it includes primarily a set of variables related to the auction process and almost no information 
on the past performance of SOEs. As we pointed out, this approach reflects the complexities of the 
political context of the country and the overall state of SOEs after the war. In this context, the Agency had 
a single priority, i.e. transforming SOE assets as swiftly as possible, with auctions being the natural 
choice due to their simplicity and swiftness. The approach taken by the authorities in Kosovo seems to 
echo the key lesson of privatization according to López-de-Silanes (1997, p.1019): ‘do not do too much, 
simply sell’.  
Before we discuss the variables of the model, we look first at the auction process in Kosovo in the light of 
the auction literature. Kosovo provides a unique example of a privatization program relying almost 
entirely on this method of sale. Other former Socialist countries, such as Albania, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and others, used auctions for specific enterprises or industries but largely in combination with 
other modes of privatization (Korovilas, 2006; Shafik, 1994).  The economic benefits of auctions as a 
means of allocating resources led UNMIK officials in Kosovo to adopt this method of transformation. 
Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny (1994) argue that auctions are one of the most efficient means of allocating 
assets or shares to those who value them most. In addition, according to them, auctions produce market 
valuations of assets of enterprises from the start and hence facilitate subsequent trading. Auctions do not 
require bureaucrats to assign values to companies, thus avoiding arbitrariness, delays, and corruption. 
Finally, auctions are much less susceptible to corruption and sales to friends at low prices than are other 
methods of direct sales.  
In addition to economic reasons, the political and institutional context was paramount when selecting 
auctions as the method of sale. This thinking is in line with Klemperer (1999) who argues that the auction 
process needs to address the wider economic circumstances of the country, particularly the dangers posed 
by political and administrative pressures. The experience of other TEs offers evidence that politicians and 
special-interest groups influenced the design of the auction process as in the Czech Republic and the 
Russian Federation. As Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny (1994) argue, auctions during Czech and Russian 
voucher privatizations had to be simplified and adjusted to political reality even when doing so meant 
violating economic principles of the auction design.  
Designing the auction process in itself is a challenge. Stiglitz (1995) explains that the two most important 
determinants of a successful auction process are ensuring a level playing field for all participants and 
enhancing the number of bidders in the auction process. The Agency adopted the highest-price sealed-bid 
auction, whereby each bidder independently submits a single bid, without seeing the other bids, through a 
single round public auction and the shares of the newly established enterprise or asset/s of SOEs 
undergoing liquidation are sold to the highest bidder.
15
 The design of this type of auction is viewed as a 
more efficient mechanism than other rationing devices, because it rests largely on the principles of 
competition policy (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994).
 
Also, as Klemperer (2004) argues, sealed-bid 
auctions are preferred as they reduce the likelihood of collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behavior. 
However, in the case of Kosovo, Korovilas (2006) identifies a number of vulnerabilities of this sale 
method. First, contrary to Klemperer  (2004), he believes that the high degree of uncertainty related to the 
outcome of the sealed-bid auction increases the temptation for collusive behavior. According to him, the 
risk of colluding is greater in Kosovo due to the small size of the bidder community.
16
  
Second, according to Korovilas (2006, p.345), an even greater danger comes from ‘the fear of coercion, 
where the successful bidder for an SOE is “encouraged” to withdraw his bid in order for the next highest 
bidder to win the contest’. This was a frequent occurrence, especially in the first decade of privatization. 
However, in recent years the Agency has tackled this issue by introducing a provision in the legislation 
requiring that if the highest bidder withdraws, the asset be offered to the subsequent bidders only at the 
price offered by the highest bidder. Finally, speculative bids – bidding far above the true valuation of the 
item auctioned – present a grave challenge. In this case the speculative highest bidder has the opportunity 
to extract payment from the second highest bidder in return for withdrawing his bid. The introduction of 
an entry fee and deposit requirement by the Agency was aimed at addressing this problem. 
Determining the effect of competition on the prices generated by the auction process is one of the 
objectives of our empirical investigation. In addition to variables capturing the auction process, the model 
developed here sheds light on four other groups of independent variables: 
Pricei = f(Auctioni, Asseti, Agencyi, Buyeri, Electioni) (1) 
                                                        
15 The general rules of the auction (or the tender rules) in Kosovo are provided in PAK’s Generic Rules of Tender 
http://www.pak-ks.org/desk/inc/media/2B6BC80D-5B75-4483-BA9C-9085F150E38A.pdf; accessed on: February 1, 2019). The 
regulation sets out the procedure for the sale of SOE assets, including conditions and criteria for: (i) submitting bids; (ii) 
classification and selection of bids; and (iii) signing sale contracts with winning bidders.  
16 Although according to the legislation, participating in the auction is free to all legal and natural persons apart from public 
institutions, public enterprises, SOEs, and legal and natural persons that have committed criminal offences, the bidder community 
remains small, especially as the Agency has not been able to attract foreign investors, including a sufficient number of Diaspora 
investors.  
Specifically, the Price of a company or an asset i is a function of a vector of the auction procedures and 
requirements during the sale of i (Auctioni); a vector of characteristics of the new company or asset 
undergoing auction (Asseti); a set of dummies related to the Agency’s operations (Agencyi); the 
characteristics of the buyer (Buyeri); and the potential effect of elections at the time of the sale of each 
asset (Electioni). In addition, we include two sets of dummy variables. First, time dummies to control for 
otherwise un-modeled systematic influences on prices in particular periods (e.g. institutional and 
procedural weaknesses in the early years of privatization as well as subsequent simplifications and 
improvements in administrative procedures). In particular, the year dummies control for asset price 
inflation, which in the absence of suitable deflators is our preferred strategy. And, second, separate 
dummy variables for the original SOE of each new company or asset, which control for all time invariant 
(or, at least, “slowly moving”) and otherwise omitted influences on prices arising from the asset(s) having 
been part of a particular SOE. In the absence of information on the past performance of SOEs (explained 
below), these SOE dummies control for the history of assets before privatization, in particular their initial 
conditions with respect to whether SOE assets were being actively used before auction and, if so, their 
performance as business assets.   
Table 1 presents the precise definitions of, together with standard descriptive statistics on, the dependent 
variable and the independent variables organized according to these five groups. Previous studies looking 
at the determinants of privatization prices use the so called Privatization Q, which is the net present value 
of the nominal privatization price of an enterprise net of all restructuring costs (see López-de-Silanes, 
1997). However, our model does not include any measure of prior restructuring of SOEs, because in 
Kosovo there was no attempt to overhaul and revive these enterprises prior to privatization. Accordingly, 
our dependent variable is the nominal price of each asset as registered in the sales contract (Pricei). 
A point distinguishing privatization in Kosovo from that in other transition economies is the generally 
very low prices of assets under consideration. The average price of assets, as shown in Table 1, is just 
over €300,000. However, even this is rather misleading as the distribution is heavily right-skewed. The 
median price is €122,111; around 30 per cent of assets were sold under €50,000; just over 60 per cent 
were sold under or equal to €200,000; and only 7.7 per cent of assets were sold between €1 million and €5 
million.  (The full range of prices is provided in Appendix 1.) 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 The impact of the auction process on price determination is captured through a number of variables: 
competition in the auction process represented by the number of bidders (no_bidders); the Agency’s 
experience with the auction process (sales_exp); duration of the sale process (sales_duration); deposit 
requirement (deposit); and preliminary injunction (prel_inj). In line with competition theory, the auction 
literature – and related studies on the determinants of privatization prices – concludes that greater 
competition will affect auction prices positively (see López-de-Silanes, 1997). The degree of competition 
in the auction process is related to the restriction on entry in the auction process. Hence, as a general rule, 
more bidders and greater ease of entry enhance competition. The Agency, as explained earlier, placed no 
formal restrictions on auction entrants, apart from restricting some institutions and delinquent individuals 
or entities from bidding (applied since 2006). Through simple and low-cost entry procedures the Agency 
strove to make the auction process conducive to a greater number of entrants. However, cases of coercion 
whereby either the winning bidder is forced to withdraw its bid, or bidders are prevented from entering 
the auction process altogether, may have affected the competition in the bidding process as well as 
undermined the legitimacy of the privatization process in Kosovo (see Korovilas, 2006). Our model 
utilizes the actual number of bidders in the final round of sale for each asset to measure the degree of 
competition in the auction process.   
Both theoretical and empirical work suggest that the level of privatization prices is affected by “learning” 
and “credibility” effects. Both feed into the effect of experience accumulated over time. López-de-Silanes 
(1997) argues that countries use learning to sequence the sale of their assets in privatization, starting with 
companies in more competitive sectors, where there is presumably less room for errors, and at latter 
stages, when knowledge is accumulated, selling firms in oligopolistic or non-tradable industries where 
mistakes may be more costly. Further, he suggests that as privatization and its results become better 
known to the public, “credibility” increases, translating into a willingness to pay higher prices. In terms of 
sequencing, the Agency first took aim at what were seen as viable companies, leaving the rest of the 
assets to be sold through the liquidation process. In the first decade of privatization, the Agency 
transformed the viable assets of former SOEs into over 750 new companies. The process of establishing 
new companies came to an end in 2013 and, since then, the Agency has only been liquidating the 
remaining SOE assets. Hence, the fact that the more viable and easily saleable assets (i.e. those without 
administrative and political constraints) were sold first, followed by less viable assets, may have a bearing 
on the direction of the effect of experience on prices.     
In terms of credibility, the public perception of the Agency has changed significantly over the years. In 
the early days, the process of transformation was generally supported by the management and employee 
representatives (see Knudsen, 2013). However, over time, the representatives of enterprises and the 
general public became disillusioned with the process, resisting further transformation and even legally 
challenging some of the previous decisions on the sale of assets. It seems that the credibility of the 
Agency or the process has diminished considerably over time.
17
 Our model treats the notion of “learning” 
and “credibility” as the effect of experience on price determination. It does so in a purely “learning-by-
doing” fashion as presented in the micro-literature. Hence, as our measures of experience we adopt the 
number of assets sold before the case at hand since the beginning of the privatization program 
(sales_exp).  
Another determinant of privatization prices is the speed or swiftness with which the sale or privatization 
is carried out (sales_duration). The literature on the determinants of privatization prices is ambiguous on 
the direction of the effect of the speed of sale on the prices obtained, arguing that insiders (i.e. an 
enterprise’s management and employees) may react differently than outside investors to the 
announcement of sale of the enterprise. In some cases, as López-de-Silanes (1997) argues, the 
announcement may trigger a change in stakeholders’ behavior, leading to lower productivity, lower 
performance, wage increases, and so on. In these cases, the faster the process of sale takes place the 
better. In other cases, as other evidence shows, the announcement improves the company’s performance. 
In the case of Kosovo, since most of the enterprises were inactive at the time when the transformation of 
their assets began, it would not make sense to look for the stakeholders’ response to the announcement of 
sale in the light of performance indicators. However, for Kosovo, it is reasonable to relate the swiftness of 
the sale to the type of asset sold (we follow this line of thought in our econometric investigation). Even 
following this reasoning, the relationship between the speed of sale and prices obtained is ambiguous. 
Generally, assets such as buildings, technology, and related required a faster treatment as they were 
degrading by the day. On the other hand, the Agency may have considered a slower approach to selling 
land as the latter generally does not lose value over time. Our duration of sales variable (sales_exp) is 
measured by the number of days between the first public announcement of the sale and the completion of 
the sale (i.e. the signing of the contract) and displays a large variation, from over two months to almost a 
decade and a half (i.e. assets that have gone through a number of rounds of sales and/or sales that were 
legally challenged by third parties in the SCSC).  
                                                        
17 Recently, Public Pulse, a UNDP publication, presented data showing that the public considers KTA as one of the three most 
corrupt institutions in Kosovo (see http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/operations/projects/democratic 
governance/PublicPulse.html (Accessed on: February 21, 2019).  
On two other auction-related variables in the model, the literature argues that the deposit requirement 
(deposit) enhances the quality of the auction by filtering out speculative bids and giving certainty to the 
whole privatization program, hence the effect on prices is expected to be positive (see López-de-Silanes, 
1997).
18
 Conversely, preliminary injunction (prel_inj) – an order issued by the Special Chamber at the 
request of third parties prohibiting the Agency from selling an asset until a ruling is given – is likely to 
have a negative effect on the prices as it generally increases uncertainty, raising fears of potential buyers 
that the asset may come with certain liabilities, not only financial.     
Further, the model incorporates two buyer-specific variables: first, the presence of foreign buyers in the 
process of privatization – whether the buyer is foreign or local (buyer_origin); and, second, the buyer’s 
legal status – whether the buyer is a physical person or a legal person (buyer_entity). In the case of the 
latter, one would assume that due to the capital prowess of legal persons, they would be willing to pay 
higher prices. In the case of the former, López-de-Silanes (1997) explains that opening the auction 
process to foreigners should drive up prices through increased competition and reduced scope for 
collusion. He further argues that insufficient private domestic savings may also be an additional argument 
in favor of attracting foreigners to bid. The literature argues that foreign investors have generally favored 
the direct sale method of privatization (see Goldberg & Nellis, 2008). However, the process of 
transformation of property in Kosovo did not attract foreign investors in large numbers as in other 
transition countries. The largest share of FDI has come from Kosovo’s Diaspora, who account for over 70 
per cent of “foreign” buyers and sales of €57 million, which is just less than 9 per cent of total sales 
revenues from privatization (Gashi, 2019).
19
 The perceived political instability, institutional-related 
constraints, and the unresolved issue of Kosovo’s status are serious risks for foreign investors, and even 
to Diaspora investors.  
Due to the lack of data, the model is limited on enterprise-specific variables. While other investigations 
have used measures of sales, costs, capacity utilization, technology, labor productivity, liabilities, and so 
on, our model is restricted to variables such as the type of asset (a company, building, land, and 
combinations thereof), size of land or buildings (land_m2 and building_m2), sector (sector), location 
(location) and region (region). In terms of theoretical predictions, the size of the asset should have a 
positive impact on the price, although we allow for this relationship to be quadratic. Next, sector refers to 
                                                        
18 This variable will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.  
19 The variable “buyer_identity” in the database does not distinguish between the Diaspora investors and genuinely “foreign” 
investors; otherwise we would have included a Diaspora dummy in the regression directly.  
the primary activity of the SOE to which an asset belongs, grouped into manufacturing, agriculture, 
services, and construction. The expected sign of the sector variables is ambiguous. The dummy for 
location identifies the sold assets’ location, either a city or a village. It is expected that assets located in 
urban areas will fetch higher prices than those located in rural areas. In the case of region, the Agency 
divides Kosovo into five regions: Prishtina; Mitrovica; Prizren; Peja; and Gjilan.  
Finally, a novel feature of this investigation is that we draw on the political business cycles literature (see 
Drazen, 2002 for a summary) to assess whether the sale of assets has been manipulated to influence 
election outcomes in Kosovo (e.g. by downward manipulation of prices in return for political and/or 
financial support). The literature has long identified opportunistic use of fiscal and monetary instruments 
to improve economic conditions prior to elections to make voters more inclined to vote for the governing 
party. Recently, Imami et al. (2018) have argued that, in the transition context, opportunistic politicians 
may also manipulate non-fiscal/non-monetary policy instruments, while Uberti et al. (2019, p.1) report 
evidence from post-conflict Kosovo (2001–2018) that the pattern of mining-sector licensing is consistent 
with electoral opportunism ‘despite the checks-and-balance mechanisms introduced by Kosovo’s 
international administrators … to reduce the politicization of licensing’. Accordingly, we control for the 
possibility that such a political dynamic may be present also in the privatization process.
20
 Uberti et al. 
(2019, p.1) provide both theoretical motivation and empirical evidence that the issuance of mining 
licenses displays a statistically significant and economically substantial rise before scheduled elections 
but no such effect before early (or unscheduled) elections (when unanticipated and tight schedules limit 
the incumbent’s ability to manipulate the allocation of licenses). Accordingly, we specify our model with 
two dummy variables, both covering asset sales during the two quarters before elections: one for regular 
or scheduled elections (election_reg), which is expected to show a negative effect if privatization prices 
are subject to the same dynamics as the issuing of mining licenses; and another for unscheduled elections 
(election_un), which is not expected to show a significant effect. (Since the end of the war, Kosovo has 
undergone six elections – three of each type.)       
4. Empirical strategy and results 
4.1 Data 
                                                        
20 Board members are nominated by the Government and approved by the Parliament, thus they are virtually “political” 
appointees. At the time of its establishment, the Agency’s Board of Directors – the main decision-making body – was composed 
of international and local members with internationals being in the majority at least in terms of voting rights. The latter had 
largely no political affiliations in Kosovo. Only in 2014 did the composition of the Board change to fully local members.   
The analysis utilizes the administrative dataset of the Privatization Agency of Kosovo, which contains 
information on 1,613 SOE assets sold by the Agency between 2003 and 2018 (for details see Table 1). 
The dataset covers the entire population of assets sold during this period. The empirical analysis excludes 
assets sold at prices over €5 million as well as those sold through the special spin-off method (53 
altogether). The reason for the former exclusion is the distortion that would be caused by including a few 
very large values. The second group were excluded because special spin-offs require extended monitoring 
by the Agency over a number of years (level of investment, employment retention, type of activity, and so 
on) and also have conditions attached to the sale (which effectively means that the privatization was not 
complete as the Agency can reclaim the asset if the conditions are not met).
21
 The excluded group have 
mean and median (€4.06 and €1.72 million) of a different order of magnitude than those included in the 
analysis. 
The rate of missing observations is relatively small for the variables included in the model. The duration 
of sales and the number of bidders have a greater share of missing observations relative to the rest, with 7 
and 7.6 per cent, respectively. However, the major drawback of the database is its limited scope. As 
already pointed out, there is no performance-related information for SOEs prior to their transformation.  
 
4.2 Econometric model 
We use OLS to estimate Eq.1 as a linear model. All continuous variables are specified as natural 
logarithms (denoted Ln) so that estimated coefficients are to be interpreted as constant elasticities. The 
high degree of unobserved heterogeneity of assets conditioned the division of the dataset into four sub-
sets based on the type of assets. This strategy was required also because of the persistent evidence of non-
linearities (i.e. uniform and unambiguous failures of the Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error 
Test – RESET) when estimating our model on the whole sample, suggesting the possibility of un-
modeled structural breaks.  Consistent with this evidence, satisfactory model diagnostics (see Table 2) 
were obtained upon dividing the sample into four groups according to the classification of assets used by 
the Agency, namely: i) land-only; ii) buildings-only; iii) mixed – assets containing land and buildings; 
and iv) buildings-only and mixed (i.e. all asset categories except land only).  
4.3 Potential endogeneity 
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 Examples of reclaimed assets include the Grand Hotel and the Magnesite Mine Goleshi. 
Before reporting and discussing our regression results, we consider the possibility that some of our main 
variables of interest may be endogenous, namely: (i) deposit requirement (deposit), which may be thought 
to depend on the value of assets; (ii) buyer origin (buyer_origin), as foreign investors may be more 
interested in the more valuable assets; (iii) the duration of the privatization process (sales_duration), 
which may be inversely related to the value of the asset; and most importantly (iv) the number of bidders 
(bidders), because more valuable assets may attract more bidders.   
The deposit requirement for tendered assets was established with the sole aim of filtering out speculative 
bids. This was explicitly stated in Article 8, Paragraph 2, of the PAK Generic Rules of Tender that states 
‘in order to ensure good will of bidders, each eligible bidder must pay the bid deposit, the amount of 
which is assigned by the Agency, on individual basis for each subsidiary or tendered item’. As a result, 
the Agency would arbitrarily set the level of deposit high enough to filter out the speculative bids. At the 
same time, the deposit had to be set at a sufficiently low level not to deter other bidders from the bidding 
process. Only in late 2016 did the Agency attempt to formalize the process of setting a deposit for an 
asset.
22
 The methodology relied on the type of asset, location, size, and so on. A trial period proved that 
the formulae resulted in high levels of deposit requirement, which reduced the number of bidders 
significantly. The Agency then decided to abandon this provision altogether. In the context of our 
endogeneity discussion, this shows that it is unlikely that the level of deposit may have given an 
indication of the value of the asset undergoing the transformation process. In our regression models, the 
effects of such changes are controlled for by the year dummies. 
In the context of Kosovo, the other three variables – buyer’s origin, the duration of the sale and the 
number of bidders – are also unlikely to be endogenous. We explained earlier that minimal levels of 
commercial activity of SOEs prior to privatization and the absence of any market-based institutions for 
valuing assets meant that assets presented for privatization could not be valued prior to the sale, by either 
the Agency or the investor, with any precision. The Agency provided only a basic set of information for 
each asset undergoing the process, i.e.: asset type, size, location, and other information pertaining to the 
SOE to which the asset belongs; and type of sale, deposit requirement, and other details of the tendering 
process. In addition, the Agency calls on potential bidders to conduct due diligence for the SOE or the 
asset and provides site visits and access to the SOE documentation.
23
 However, on the latter, the Agency 
warns that most of the information and documentation related to a specific SOE or its tendered asset may 
have been lost, destroyed or misplaced during the 1990s and the war. In any case, as Shafik (1994) 
                                                        
22 See PAK Sales Procedures amended in September 2016.  
23 See PAK Generic Rules of Tender, Article 5, amended in September 2016. 
explains, even if such information were to be available, its worth would be limited in the context of a 
market economy. Hence, the bidders must have relied more on their own judgment as well as any private 
information to get some sense of the value of the asset. The absence of information on the value of the 
assets attenuates the potential endogeneity of these three variables as a major source of estimation bias. 
Moreover, there are additional theoretical and contextual reasons to treat these three variables as 
exogenous.  
Foreign buyers are normally expected to participate actively in the privatization process and particularly 
to bid for the more valuable assets. They use their superior knowledge about the true value of a firm and 
are able to offer higher prices for that firm. In the case of Kosovo, because of the political uncertainty and 
the pressure from Serbia that it would dispute the legality of the privatization process
24
, foreign buyers 
were less present than they were in other transition countries. Contrary to privatization in other transition 
countries, the absence of well-known multinational companies in the privatization of companies in food, 
drinks, and other industries was noticeable in Kosovo.
25
 Instead, as already mentioned in Section 3, most 
of the so-called “foreign” buyers were actually members of the Kosovo Diaspora bidding for privatized 
assets. Diaspora bidders had access to extra resources and were able to offer higher prices for assets than 
local bidders. Otherwise, factors affecting the entry of these bidders were not different from the factors 
influencing other bidders. Thus, the potential for endogeneity is much less than if actual “foreign” 
investors had participated in the process. 
The duration of the process may be thought of as an endogeneous variable because the more valuable 
assets may be sold more quickly. However, in the case of Kosovo, the duration of the auction process was 
set administratively by the Agency (initially, up to three months and reduced later) while departures from 
the prescribed duration were caused by ownership, legal and political disputes, leading to intervention by 
courts or the Board of the Agency and consequent delays to the contract completion.
26
 Hence, in the 
context of Kosovo, the duration of the privatization process was exogenous with respect to price. 
                                                        
24 Serbia has particularly targeted foreign investors, trying to dissuade them from entering Kosovo. An example of this was the 
Brezovica Ski Resort where a French investor pulled out of the negotiated privatization process at the final stages due to pressure 
from Serbia.  
25 The few exceptions of foreign companies participating in the process were related to SOEs under the special spin-off method 
explained earlier (and which are excluded from this investigation). 
26 For example, in some cases, individuals or groups of people filed complaints against the Agency and halted the process even 
when the winning bid had been selected in the auction process. In other cases, the Agency would reject the winning bid on the 
basis of suspected collusion between bidders resulting in lower auction prices. In some cases, the process was prolonged because 
the asset simply did not attract bidders. 
The number of bidders may be considered as potentially endogenous because of simultaneity, i.e. the 
possibility that not only does the number of bidders influence the auction price but that, reflecting 
expectations, the asset price may influence the number of bidders. Although this study utilizes the full 
administrative dataset of the Privatization Agency of Kosovo, this was not designed to encompass 
variables to serve as instruments to address potentially endogenous variables in a future econometric 
investigation. Accordingly, we found only one theoretically plausible instrument for the number of 
bidders in the database: i.e. a dummy variable for whether the auction required bidder prequalification 
(preq_bidders).
27
 This variable may influence the number of bidders but otherwise has no bearing on the 
auction price. Hence, it can serve to identify the effect of the number of bidders on the auction price 
independently from any feedback – via expectations – of the asset price on the number of bidders. 
However, because this variable is a “weak instrument” – i.e. it is not very strongly correlated with the 
number of bidders – two-stage least squares estimation is unlikely to yield unbiased estimates. Instead, we 
use indirect least squares (ILS) estimation, which is appropriate for exactly identified simultaneous 
equations models. This approach is explained, and its results are presented, in Appendix 2. The ILS 
estimates of the constant elasticity of price with respect to the number of bidders for each of our four 
samples yield three with the same sign and order of magnitude as the OLS estimates (reported in Table 2), 
although only one of these three is statistically significant. These provide some, albeit not strong, 
evidence that our OLS estimates are not impaired by endogeneity to such an extent as to nullify the 
conclusion that the number of bidders has a sufficiently substantial positive impact on auction prices to be 
of interest to policy makers.  
This conclusion is strengthened by comparing the broad similarity between our OLS and ILS estimates 
with similar findings from previous studies that have been able to implement more thorough 
investigations into the potential endogeneity of the number of bidders. López-de-Silanes (1997) argues 
that models of price determination may be complicated by the potential endogeneity of three variables: (i) 
restructuring; (ii) the duration of the privatization process; and (iii) the number of bidders. We now 
consider to what extent, if any, this study is subject to the same concerns. López-de-Silanes (1997, 
p.1011) find that ‘taking account of the endogeneity of restructuring policies reverses some of the results 
… in the one-step (OLS) specification’, although this finding is not supported by either Arin and Okten 
(2003; Table 4b, comparing Columns 4 and 5) or Santos (2016; comparing Tables 4 and 6) whose OLS 
                                                        
27 The “prequalification of bidders” is a process designed to ensure the legality of bidders in the bidding process. The process 
filters out the physical or legal persons with a criminal past either for general offences or for offences related to the privatization 
process. In addition, it prohibits bidders that had occupied socially-owned property, those who had infringed upon terms of 
contract or had an outstanding debt or penalty to the Agency or any enterprise administered by the Agency. As such, this variable 
is not related to the value of the company and the price it may fetch in the bidding process; i.e., it is an exogenous variable. 
and Two-Stage Least Squares estimates yield substantially unchanged estimates of restructuring effects 
on privatization prices. However, such effects are not applicable in our study, because in Kosovo no 
restructuring was undertaken prior to privatization, in large part reflecting lack of capacity (World Bank, 
2004). The other two variables highlighted by López-de-Silanes (1997) as potentially endogenous – the 
duration of the privatization process and the number of bidders – do feature prominently in our model. 
However, the evidence from previous studies suggests that there are no substantial endogeneity biases in 
the estimated effects of these variables (at least, none that would alter any policy implications). According 
to the estimates reported by López-de-Silanes (1997, pp.994 and 1001) addressing the potential 
endogeneity of these variables makes no substantial difference to the estimates.
28
 The same conclusion 
regarding the duration of the privatization process and the number of bidders is replicated by Santos 
(2016; comparing Table 4 with Table 6),
29
 while these variables are treated as exogenous by Arin and 
Okten (2010). Taking into account that endogeneity associated with restructuring is precluded in our 
study together with lack of evidence from all previous studies that either the duration of the privatization 
process or the number of bidders are endogenous to an extent that matters, increases confidence that our 
OLS estimates are reasonable as indicative magnitudes.  
Finally, in our empirical strategy we have taken precautionary measures to address the potential 
endogeneity of these or other variables insofar as this may arise from omitted variables, i.e. unobserved 
variables that might influence both the dependent variable and one or more independent variables. To this 
end, we exploit the hierarchical nature of our “pseudo panel” (Antonakis et al., 2010: 1092).  Each of the 
1,560 observations on privatized assets (Level 1) is nested within one of the 351 state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) by which it was previously owned (Level 2). Accordingly, we specify our models with SOE fixed 
effects, each one of which controls for all the unobserved SOE-invariant effects on auction prices that are 
common to the assets nested within that SOE (including most of the information made available to 
investors noted above). Hence, insofar as the value of the assets to be privatized was influenced by the 
SOE to which it belonged, this value is not part of the idiosyncratic error term but is controlled for – 
together with other sources of unobserved heterogeneity – by fixed effects in the estimated part of the 
                                                        
28 In the case of total length of sale, in the three OLS models the estimates by López-de-Silanes are either -0.0004 or -0.0003 (in 
both case with a standard error of 0.0001); whereas the three two-step instrumental variables models addressing potential 
endogeneity yield estimates of either -0.0005 or -0.0006 (in both case with a standard error of 0.0001). In the case of the total 
number of bidders, the three OLS estimates are 0.0846 (SE 0.0239), 0.0880 (SE 0.0206) and 0.0803 (SE 0.0242) and the three 
two-step estimates are 0.0658 (SE 0.0273), 0.0641 (SE 0.0233) and 0.0631 (SE 0.0234).  
29 In the case of the “total length of the auction”, in the two OLS models the estimates are both -0.0004 (in both case with a 
standard error of 0.0001); whereas the two two-step instrumental variables models addressing potential endogeneity yield 
estimates of -0.0004 and -0.0003 (in both case with a standard error of 0.0002). In the case of the “Number of bidders”, the two 
OLS estimates are 0.0979 (SE 0.0303) and 0.0989 (SE 0.0292) and the two two-step estimates are 0.1480 (SE 0.0693), 0.1048 
(SE 0.0698). 
model. We can be reasonably confident that we have fully addressed the problem of omitted variables. 
The SOE (Level 2) fixed effects address unobserved heterogeneity in auction prices associated with 
previous ownership and use of assets, although we cannot be certain that this fully accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the asset level. However, other unobserved influences are controlled by 
either time dummies (as noted above) or regional and other location dummies (for example, assets taking 
longer to sell in Serb-majority areas because of local hostility to privatization). 
In conclusion, (i) we have established on theoretical and contextual grounds that the variables suspected 
of potential endogeneity may legitimately be treated as exogenous in our study; (ii) in the case of the 
number of bidders, we have provided evidence from both within our study and from the wider literature 
that no major endogeneity bias arises from simultaneity; and (iii) we have explained how we address 
potential endogeneity arising from omitted variables. In addition we note that, because our database 
allows us to analyze all of the assets sold in the period under observation, we avoid endogeneity issues 
associated with sample selection (Arin and Okten, 2003). Accordingly, we return to the discussion of the 
OLS estimates presented in Table 2. 
 
4.4 Regression results and discussion 
Table 2 presents regression results from OLS estimation for the four subsets of assets. We report cluster-
robust standard errors and note that for each of the four models reported in Table 2 the Ramsey RESET 
indicates the validity of linear modeling (and, hence, the validity of our statistical inference). 
Furthermore, each model controls for both group and time unobserved heterogeneity, by using SOE and 
year dummies. All four models reveal a high degree of fit. The R
2
 ranges between 0.81 and 0.89, meaning 
that in each case between 81 and 89 per cent of variance in prices is explained by the set of independent 
variables included in the model.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
In the rest of this Section, we discuss the expected effects of the five groups of variables on price. The 
Kosovo-specific factors that may have influenced the prices of SOE assets beyond what we have been 
able to measure through regression analysis will be discussed in Section 5. (These cannot be included in 
the regression analysis, because – by definition – national influences do not vary across observations.) 
4.4.1 The auction process and its features 
The model incorporates five variables related to the features and requirements of the auction process: 
experience; duration; competition among bidders; deposit requirement; and the assets having been subject 
to a preliminary injunction. Initially, quadratic terms of the continuous variables were included to model 
potential non-linear effects; however, none of these proved statistically significant in any of the models 
estimated and so are not included in the specifications reported in Table 2.  
The estimated effect of the experience variable (sales_exp) is negative in all regressions but statistically 
significant only in the buildings-only regression (Column 2), in which, keeping other variables fixed, a 
one per cent increase in the number of assets sold decreases the predicted price by an almost equal 
proportion (i.e. 1.085 per cent). The interpretation of our regression coefficients needs to be mindful of 
the presence of SOE dummies. Because these capture price variation between assets associated with 
individual SOEs across the privatization program, the estimated coefficients on our variables of interest 
capture how the price varies across the different asset sales within individual SOEs. In the case of our 
sales experience variable, because our measure – the number of previous sales since the start of the 
privatization program – is time-varying, the presence of year dummies, which capture systematic 
influences on prices between particular years, means that the coefficient captures the effect within 
calendar years. The consequently constrained variation of our sales experience variable – i.e. within SOE 
effects within particular years – may explain the lack of statistical significance of this variable in three of 
the four estimates. Nonetheless, as anticipated in the literature review (above), the uniformly negative 
coefficient on experience seems to reflect the effect of the deteriorating quality or the increasing difficulty 
over time of selling the assets. Accordingly, the Agency’s practice of sequencing from more viable and 
less complicated to less viable and more complicated assets resulted in lower privatization prices over 
time. This explains why our negative results for the experience variable in the buildings-only regression 
are at odds with the predictions of the literature. Moreover, while López-de-Silanes (1997) argues that 
experience will generate price increases through accumulated learning and increased credibility, in 
Kosovo the public view of the credibility of the privatization process has diminished over time (see earlier 
discussion); and the way the experience variable is constructed – i.e. the number of previously sold assets 
since the beginning of the privatization program – may not capture the ”learning effect” as discussed in 
the López-de-Silanes framework.  
As expected, the estimated effect of the duration of the auction process (sales_duration) is uniformly 
negative across all four regressions but statistically significant only in the buildings-only and mixed assets 
regressions (Columns 2 and 4). For these types of assets, the coefficients indicate price elasticities of -
0.127 and -0.121, respectively; i.e. keeping other variables fixed, a one per cent increase in the number of 
days needed to complete the sale contract decreases the predicted price for these assets by a little over a 
tenth of a percentage point. Other studies reach similar conclusions; i.e., higher prices are associated with 
greater speed of the process (Arin & Okten, 2003; López-de-Silanes, 1997; Santos, 2016). However, the 
explanations for the negative price effects are different. In the other studies in the literature, the duration 
of privatization has a negative impact on the operating efficiency of the company (as measured by profit, 
sales, capacity utilization, and productivity) as the incentives of managers and workers collapse with the 
announcement of sale, thereby lowering the value of the company. In contrast, although such incentives 
were absent in Kosovo, because the SOEs were largely inactive before the announcement of sale, there 
are Kosovo-specific reasons why duration is negatively associated with price. First, the persistence of 
clientelism in Kosovo (Uberti et al., 2019), such that a protracted sale process increases the perceived risk 
of the playing field being tilted in favor of a “well-connected” buyer which, in turn, gives rise to: (i) self-
selection in the sense that some people decide not to enter the process; and (ii) more conservative bids 
from those who do participate, reflecting the increased risk. Second, the duration of the sale is also 
indicative of the difficulties of completing the sale of an asset due to claims against it. This also tended to 
increase the perception of risk among potential buyers, thereby reinforcing the adverse price effects of 
self-selection and conservative bidding.   
The auction literature is consistent on the positive relationship between competition – as measured by the 
number of bidders – and price. Consistently positive effects of competition on price premiums are found 
in López-de-Silanes (1997), Arin & Okten (2003), and Santos (2016). Our regressions likewise produce 
consistently positive estimates for the effect of competition on privatization prices. All four reported 
coefficients are statistically significant at the one per cent level (Table 2). Keeping other variables fixed, a 
one per cent increase in the number of bidders increases the predicted price of assets by between 0.63 and 
0.80 per cent. 
The final two auction-related variables have the anticipated effects. The deposit requirement (deposit) 
filters out speculative bids, thereby making the process more credible and resulting in higher prices. We 
find the effect to be positive and statistically significant at one per cent in all four regressions. The 
regression results show that a one per cent increase in the deposit required to enter the bidding process 
triggers an almost uniform increase in the predicted prices for all classes of assets (the estimated effect 
ranges between approximately 0.50 and 0.63 per cent). Conversely, a preliminary injunction (prel_inj) in 
the past, as expected, affects prices negatively in all estimated regressions. Once again, we conjecture that 
the risks associated with assets under court proceedings had a depressing effect on prices. The magnitude 
of the estimated coefficients is high, ranging between -0.72 and -0.94. In other words, keeping all else 
constant, buildings or building and mixed assets (Column 2 and Column 4) with previous preliminary 
injunction are predicted to fetch between 51.6 and 60.2 per cent lower prices than those not having been 
subject to court proceedings.
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4.4.2 The Agency-related factors 
For the category of land, prices seem to have been higher during the PAK administration (2008 and after) 
than during the KTA’s (up to 2008). In this instance, keeping other variables fixed, the difference in the 
price of land during the PAK period is around 160 per cent higher than in the KTA period. Our prior 
belief was that the asset prices would be higher during KTA times, as the international administration 
would have ensured a level playing field and thereby instilled certainty into the process. However, the 
estimated effect on land assets indicates the reverse. This may reflect two different contexts, one during 
the UN protectorate prior to 2008 and the other the post-independence context. In the early period, which 
included the immediate post-war years, acute privatization difficulties arising from the poor business 
environment, shortage of capital and institutional failures at the Agency may have put downward pressure 
on land prices. Conversely, in the latter period, and against the background of booming construction, 
partly fuelled by remittances flowing into real estate, land was seen as a safer and more viable option than 
other investment opportunities.  
The dummy variable for assets sold as new companies (mode_newco) compared to liquidated assets is 
positive, albeit at the 10 per cent level of statistical significance, only for buildings plus mixed assets 
(Column 4). Assets sold as new companies generate higher prices as they include the most viable assets of 
SOEs. The estimated coefficient of 0.34 suggests that, in percentage terms, assets sold as new companies 
fetched over 40 per cent higher prices than liquidated assets. Investigating further the subset of newly 
established companies – by estimating our fully specified model only for NewCos as the type of asset 
(presented in Appendix 3) – the results do not show substantial differences compared to the models for 
                                                        
30 The percentage difference has been obtained by exponentiating the coefficient of the dummy variable and subtracting one. All 
statistically significant dummies were interpreted using this method.       
other assets reported in Table 2.
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 In terms of the auction process, the degree of competition, deposit 
requirement, and preliminary injunction show the same effects as for other classes of assets. Again, PAK 
has managed to fetch higher prices for NewCos compared to its predecessor. It terms of asset 
characteristics, both the size of land and buildings play an important role in determining the prices of 
privatized assets. Other regression results – for sector, buyer entity, location, and the region – are largely 
the same as in the regressions discussed so far.          
4.4.3 Buyer characteristics 
The literature shows that opening the auction to foreign bidders translates into higher prices. In the case of 
Mexico the prices offered by foreign investors were 25 per cent higher than prices offered by locals 
(López-de-Silanes, 1997). Similar indications of a positive relationship between foreign capital and price 
premiums are identified by Claessens (1995) in the case of the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Santos 
(2016) in the case of Brazil. In our study, the coefficients on foreign ownership (buyer_origin) are 
positive in each of the land (Column 1), buildings (Column 2), and buildings plus mixed-assets 
regressions (Column 4): “foreigners” have paid 60 per cent more than locals for land and almost 95 per 
cent more for buildings and for buildings plus mixed assets. However, the magnitude of these estimated 
effects may reflect (as noted in Section 4.3) the lack of genuinely “foreign” investors and corresponding 
predominance of the Diaspora in this category of investors. Nonetheless, the cost of the deterrent effect of 
political instability and poor institutional quality may still be substantial. Finally, we expected legal 
entities (buyer_entity) to pay higher prices than would physical persons. However, this effect is 
statistically insignificant in all classes of assets. 
4.4.4 Asset characteristics 
The asset-specific characteristics proved to be relevant in determining asset prices in Kosovo. As 
expected, all four regressions show that size matters. In the case of land (land_m2), keeping other 
variables fixed, a one per cent increase in the size of the parcel increases the predicted land price by a 
quarter of one per cent. Similarly, a one per cent increase in the size of the building (build_m2) 
corresponds to a price increase of somewhat less than half a per cent. For mixed assets (Column 3 and 4), 
the magnitude of the coefficient is in-between; a one per cent increase in the size of buildings, keeping 
                                                        
31 In terms of diagnostics, the Ramsey RESET is significant only at the one per cent level in this model (p=0.022). However, this 
is to be expected as the NewCos sample – like the whole sample – contains buildings only assets, land only assets, and buildings 
and land assets, which – as explained above – entails structural discontinuities and consequent evidence of non-linearity.         
other variables constant, triggers an increase of around one-third of one per cent increase in the price of 
assets.  
Other variables indicate more or less the expected direction of the effect. Generally, land and buildings of 
manufacturing SOEs fetch higher prices than do land and buildings belonging to SOEs in agriculture, 
trade and services, and in some cases also in construction. Next, assets located in a city attract higher 
prices than assets located in a village. Finally, it is rather interesting that land outside the capital Prishtina 
attracts significantly higher prices. Indeed, prices of all classes of assets sold in the region of Mitrovica, 
an industrial hub in former Yugoslav times, exceeded substantially those in the capital.  
4.4.5 Effect of elections 
The coefficients indicating the effect of elections are statistically insignificant for all categories of assets. 
Hence, these results provide no evidence that the process of sale of former SOE assets was used as a 
means of achieving political goals at election times. This finding may reflect the fact that the 
transformation process in Kosovo was under tight control by the international community (at least until 
2014). It could also be that the process of sale (from announcement to the completion of sale) is usually 
prolonged (on average 415 days; see Table 1) and so not susceptible to producing effects to address 
immediate political objectives.               
5. Determinants of asset prices: looking beyond regression results  
In what follows, we discuss four potential influences on the prices generated during the process of sale, 
all specific to the Kosovo context: (i) the state of SOE assets at the beginning of the process of 
transformation; (ii) the specific design of the transformation process to address political considerations; 
(iii) the weak regulatory and institutional environment, especially law enforcement mechanisms; and (iv) 
the highly contentious ownership rights prior to the beginning of the process. In the regression analysis, 
these effects are controlled for: SOE dummies control for the particular state of each SOE’s assets; and 
time dummies control for all systematic but otherwise unmodelled influences on privatization prices in 
each year from 2003 to 2018, which includes institutional influences. Nonetheless, these dummy variables 
do not enable us to identify or discuss these influences. This final section goes some way to address this 
deficiency.  
We argued throughout the paper that due to mismanagement, underinvestment, and looting in the 1990s, 
the value of SOE assets had declined substantially (see Palairet, 2002; Korovilas, 2006; Gashi, 2019). By 
the commencement of privatization in 2003, most SOEs had been inactive or operating at low capacities 
for up to 15 years. As a result, a large proportion of SOE assets were reduced to real estate property. 
Hence, prices offered during the bidding process most likely reflected the state of assets and their 
perceived low market value.          
Prices may have been affected by the specific design of the privatization process aimed at addressing the 
political dispute between Kosovo and Serbia on the issue of SOE ownership. As we pointed out earlier, in 
order to avoid any future claims against SOEs, Kosovo, and even the UN officials involved in the process 
of ownership transformation, UNMIK designed the process in a specific manner. It did not “privatize” but 
rather “transformed” the socially owned property by creating an independent and impartial institutional 
framework to manage the transformation. However, it ended up with an institutional mechanism that in 
the early days was completely detached from the rest of the institutional infrastructure in Kosovo and 
characterized by ineptitude (especially the judicial arm of the process where, to this day, there is still a 
backlog of over 20,000 cases) as well as by a low level of accountability and transparency. Although the 
buyers obtained full ownership rights, the Agency did not formally “sell” the SOE assets, instead 
“renting” them for 99 years. In terms of the impact on prices, this final aspect may have had the biggest 
influence, as it greatly increased uncertainties and reduced competition in the bidding process.
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Moreover, this goes against one of the basic premises of why privatization was needed in former socialist 
countries, i.e., assigning clearly defined property rights (Stiglitz, 1995).  
Further, as pointed out, the process of privatization in Kosovo has been conducted in a poorly developed 
regulatory and institutional environment. Experiences in other transition countries show that the process 
of privatization achieved the best results when it was complemented by corresponding policy and 
institutional reforms (see Estrin et al., 2009; Goldberg & Nellis, 2008). In the case of Kosovo, weak law 
enforcement mechanisms coupled with the highly politicized composition of the Agency’s Board 
(particularly, the local members of the Board), created room for corruption and rent seeking. A list of 
buyers made public by the Agency in early 2016 showed a substantial presence of politicians acquiring 
former SOE assets. In addition, poor law enforcement meant that many private investors (including from 
the Diaspora) who bid successfully for SOE assets could not take control of these assets as they were 
usurped by individuals with strong connections to parties in power or criminal groups. Only in 2017 were 
almost all the usurped properties brought under the control of their rightful owners. However, the 
deterrent effect remained strong amongst foreign and Diaspora investors. The small presence of foreign 
                                                        
32 To this day there is no legal clarification concerning what happens after the 99 years run out. 
investors in the process of transformation, particularly Diaspora investors – seen as a potential engine of 
development of Kosovo – reduced substantially the pool of potential bidders and impaired the credibility 
of the process.  
Another impediment to the process of transformation was a result of highly contentious property rights 
prior to the beginning of the process. This goes beyond the social ownership inherited from former 
Yugoslavia (see earlier discussion). It rather concerns property transformations that occurred in Kosovo 
during Yugoslav times and up to the end of the millennium. These complications resulted, first from the 
nationalization process following the establishment of the Communist regime, and second, from other 
land swaps that were common during socialist times. In the latter case, for various reasons, land 
exchanged between public and private owners was usually not recorded in cadastral registers. Cadastral 
records themselves were another complication of the process of transformation in Kosovo, as the Serbian 
authorities retained possession of the cadastral books when they left Kosovo in the aftermath of the 1999 
war. As a result, especially as there was no “restitution” (returning property to their former owners) by 
government in Kosovo as there was in other TEs, the transformation of property in Kosovo was bound to 
face a high degree of ownership claims against former SOE assets. Although the Law governing the 
privatization process in Kosovo specifies that all claims, including ownership claims, against an SOE or 
the Agency should be dealt with by the Special Chamber, potential bidders were hesitant to enter the 
bidding process for such contested properties or else offered lower prices reflecting this uncertainty. 
6. Concluding remarks  
Although the privatization of social property in other transition economies has been studied in great 
detail, there are only a few studies focusing on the sale prices of privatized assets and almost no 
systematic study of the privatization process in Kosovo, the last European country to embark on the 
transition from a socialist to a market economy. This paper explores the rationale for, and the 
implementation of, the particular method of ownership transformation employed in Kosovo, and identifies 
the range of factors that influenced the sale price of privatized assets. 
The privatization of socially owned enterprises in Kosovo took place in very specific circumstances 
unlike those in other transition economies. After the war, and with the departure of Serbian forces and 
administration, Kosovo was left with a shattered economy and infrastructure and the absence of any 
formal institutions. Initially under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK), and 
later as an independent country, the economic and political institutions of a democratic market economy 
had to be established afresh and gradually developed. The transition from a socialist to a market economy 
took place while the relevant institutions were being developed. With much of the enterprise sector lying 
idle or operating at low capacity, it was recognized that the only way to revive this sector was to transfer 
the ownership of these companies to the private sector with appropriate incentives to improve their 
conditions. But “social ownership” as the particular form of ownership inherited from former Yugoslavia, 
combined with changes in the status and economic conditions of enterprises forced through by the 
Serbian authorities in charge of Kosovo during the 1989-99 period (which were declared unlawful and 
discriminatory by UNMIK), meant that the authorities had to formulate a privatization method that would 
be suitable to these particular conditions. After much discussion, the method of direct sale to the highest 
bidder through a sealed-bid auction was adopted and, since 2003, over 1600 viable enterprises as well as 
individual assets of non-viable enterprises have gone through the auction process and transferred to the 
private sector.   
Although the auction method had been used in other transition countries, it was always used in 
conjunction with other methods. But in Kosovo, auctions were the only method of ownership 
transformation, providing an opportunity for researchers to investigate the role of auctions and the 
competitive environment in the privatization process.  Using the experience of other countries and the 
privatization literature in general, we have developed a model of privatization prices incorporating five 
sets of variables that can potentially influence auction prices: the specific features of the auction process; 
characteristics of the enterprise or asset being auctioned; the role of the privatization agency organizing 
the auctions; characteristics of buyers; and election-related factors. We utilize the administrative dataset 
of the Privatization Agency of Kosovo, covering the whole population of over 1600 enterprises and 
individual assets that have completed the privatization process, to estimate this model and explore the 
impact of individual factors.  
Given the heterogeneous nature of the assets going through the auctions (ranging from pieces of 
agricultural land to individual buildings, warehouses, and whole enterprises), the dataset was divided into 
four groups according to the classification of assets used by the Agency, namely: land-only; buildings-
only; mixed – assets containing land and buildings; and buildings-only and mixed (i.e. all asset categories 
except land-only). We also consider the issue of the potential endogeneity of some of our variables of 
interest – in particular the number of bidders – in relation to (i) specifics of the Kosovo context, (ii) our 
model specification, (iii) comparison of Indirect Least Squares and Ordinary Least Squares estimates, and 
(iv) evidence from all similar studies. We conclude that in our study the variables of interest may be 
treated as exogenous and that our OLS estimates are thus valid as indicative magnitudes.  
The model was then estimated for each group separately. Additionally, the model was estimated for assets 
classified as “new companies”.  Satisfactory model diagnostics were obtained for all estimated models. 
The estimated results are, in general, in line with the literature and expectations. Competition in the 
auction process, represented by the number of bidders, has a consistently positive effect on auction prices 
across all models. In line with expectation, the estimated effect of the introduction of the deposit 
requirement proved positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent in all models. Contrary to 
expectation, the experience accumulated by the Agency was generally associated with lower prices, 
though significant only in the buildings-only and mixed assets models. This, to a large extent, reflected 
the fact that more viable, and better quality, assets were offered for sale earlier. Duration of sales, 
likewise, has a negative effect – assets of lower quality and problematic assets (e.g. those having been 
subject to court orders at some point) took longer to sell. 
The impact of the shift from the Kosovo Trust Agency to the Privatization Agency of Kosovo was rather 
insignificant in general, except in the “land-only” sample where it was positive and significant. When the 
asset under the hammer was a new company (as opposed to a liquidated asset), the impact was positive, 
indicating the better prospect of such assets for bidders. 
Regarding bidder characteristics, as expected, foreign investors (mainly from the Diaspora) offered higher 
prices for most categories of assets, indicating their ability to pay higher prices as well as their expected 
ability to use the purchased asset more effectively. Regarding asset characteristics, the size of land and 
buildings had a positive impact on prices. Assets and companies belonging to the manufacturing sector as 
well as those located in cities attracted higher prices. Finally, contrary to the evidence for some transition 
economies of microeconomic policies being manipulated for electoral gains by the party in government, 
elections do not seem to have had any significant effect on privatization prices in Kosovo.  
Apart from factors identified in the econometric model, the privatization process, and therefore 
privatization prices, in Kosovo were affected by the particular conditions characterizing a post-war 
economy with weak institutions. These included the impact of the poor state of socially owned enterprises 
and their assets after the war; the contentious ownership rights at the beginning of the process; the weak 
regulatory and institutional environment, especially the law enforcement mechanisms; and the design of 
the privatization method aimed at addressing political considerations of UNMIK officials. As this is a 
single country study, we have been unable to model these contextual influences affecting asset prices. 
However, although these factors cannot be explicitly included in the model, their influence is reflected in, 
and controlled for, by the regression constant, a full set of SOE dummies, and the year dummies.  
Our empirical investigation suggests that policy makers should take measures to ensure the credibility of 
the privatization process, which encourages more bidders and greater competition resulting in higher 
privatization prices. They should also make greater effort to involve foreign investors, specifically the 
Diaspora community, which would not only bring additional capital and possibly know-how into the 
country but would also result in higher asset prices. More broadly, the discussion calls for policy 
measures to enhance the efficiency of courts dealing with privatization issues; improvement in cadastral 
records; greater legal clarity of ownership issues; and higher efficiency of the PAK and better inter-
institutional coordination to address challenges in the process.  
The main limitation of this study is the absence of any information on firm level indicators of the value of 
assets offered in the auction process (e.g. levels of output, employment, productivity, capital, exports, 
etc.). This information was simply not available, because in many SOEs production had stopped and/or 
the records related to the firms’ operations had been destroyed or removed to Serbia. Moreover, the 
institutions that normally enable asset valuation or provide firm-level information (e.g. equity markets, 
ministries, statistical agencies, etc.) were themselves non-existent. For this reason, the unexpected 
estimates of the effect of the experience of the privatization agency most likely reflects the omitted 
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APPENDIX 2: ILS and the potential endogeneity of the variable "number of bidders" 
The Indirect Least Squares (ILS) approach proceeds as follows.
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 First, we define two structural 
equations: 
     
 
                                 
     
 
   
 
               (2) 
where P is the natural log of the price of the asset realized at auction, B is the natural log of the number of 
bidders, Pq is a dummy variable for whether or not the auction specified bidder prequalification (the 
identifying variable), C is the usual constant term, and    and     the usual error terms. By substituting 
Eq.2 into Eq.1, and then Eq.1 into Eq.2, we obtain the corresponding reduced form equations:  
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Denote the compound coefficients on Pq in Equations 1’ and 2’ respectively as 1 and 2. Then we 
recover the structural coefficient on B (our potentially endogenous variable in Eq.1) as 1 = 1 / 2.  
We implement this procedure by (i) augmenting the reduced form equations 1’ and 2’ with all of the other 
variables – assumed to be exogenous – included in the models reported in Table 2 and (ii) estimating the 
two equations jointly as a “seemingly unrelated regression”, in order to achieve an efficiency gain by 
allowing the error terms to be correlated, and with cluster-robust standard errors. We do not report the 
regressions in full, for reasons of space (although these can be supplied on request). For our largest 
sample – all assets except land (n=989) – in the price equation (1’) Pq yields – as it should – a small and 
statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.13 (p=0.687); and in the number of bidders equation (2’) the 
estimate of -0.28 (p=0.156) confirms that Pq is at best only a weak instrument. Using these estimates to 
derive the coefficient on the log of the number of bidders (B) in the structural equation for the log of price 
(the augmented version of Eq.1 above) yields an estimate of the constant elasticity of price with respect to 
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 In essentials, the exposition in this paragraph follows Kennedy (1985: 143). 
 
the number of bidders: 0.46 (SE=0.94; p=0.628).
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 This estimate is not far away from the elasticity 
estimated by OLS: 0.68 (SE=0.042; p=0.000; see Table 2). Yet, reflecting the weakness of Pq as an 
instrument for the number of bidders, this ILS estimate cannot be regarded as different from zero at any 
conventional level of statistical significance (the 95% confidence interval stretches from -1.39 to 2.30).  
We repeat this for the other samples and obtain the following ILS estimates of the constant elasticity of 
price with respect to the number of bidders. For comparison, we add the respective OLS coefficients from 
Table 2, each of which is statistically significant at the one per cent level. 
 ILS. Land only sample (n=447): 0.28 (SE=1.39; p=0.836). 
o OLS: 0.796. 
 ILS. Buildings only sample (n=489):  -0.03   (SE=2.29; p=0.988). 
o OLS: 0.629. 
 ILS. Land and Buildings sample (n=500): 0.93   (SE=0.18; p=0.000). 
o OLS: 0.644. 
In sum, three from four ILS estimates yield results with the same sign and order of magnitude as the OLS 
estimates, although only one of these three is statistically significant. The fourth is of the opposite sign 
(although not significantly so).  
                                                        
34  alculated by Stata’s nlcom command. 
[APPENDIX 3 HERE]  
Privatization by Auction: Determinants of Asset Prices in Kosovo 
 
Tables:
TABLE 1: Definition of variables of the model and summary statistics 
Variables  Var. name Obs.  Mean Std. dev. Min Max Description Predicted sign 
Dependent variable        
Nominal price  Price 1,560 313,898.9   533,470.9  202 4,851,777.0 Privatization price of an 
enterprise/asset – the nominal 
price of an enterprise/asset in € 
as registered in the privatization 
contract. Note: as explained in 
the text, in the absence of 
suitable deflators, the effect of 
inflation is controlled by period 
dummies. 
 
Auction related variables        
Sales experience sales_exp 1,560 820.3 464.0 0 1,612 The number of assets sold 
before the case at hand since the 
beginning of the privatization 
program. 
Ambiguous 
Sales duration  sales_duration 1,454 415.3 498.2 67 5,340 The number of days between the 
first public announcement of the 
sale and the completion of the 
sale (i.e. the signing of the 
contract). 
Ambiguous 
Number of bidders no_bidders 1,442 4.6 3.8 1 33 Total number of bidders for the 




deposit 1,441 21,813.0 27,410.5 500 500,000 The deposit required to enter the 




prel_inj 1,551 0.0 0.04 0 1 Asset was subject to a 
preliminary injunction (Yes = 1; 
No = 0). 
Negative  
 
Agency related variables  
       
PAK vs. KTA pak_vs_kta 1,555  0.6   0.5  0 1 The agency in charge of 
privatization (PAK in charge=1; 
KTA in charge = 0). 
Ambiguous 
New companies newco_liq 1,560        0.5              0.5  0 1 Whether the asset was sold as a 
NewCo or it was liquated 
(NewCo = 1; liquidated assets = 
0). 
Positive 
Asset under rent asset_rent 1,560  0.3   0.5  0 1 Asset was/is under rent prior to 
sale (Yes = 1; No = 0).  
Positive 
Buyer characteristics        
Buyer’s origin buyer_origin 1,560  0.04   0.2  0 1 Whether the buyer is foreign or 
domestic (foreign = 1; otherwise 
= 0). 
Positive 
Buyer’s legal status buyer_entity 1,560  0.2   0.4  0 1 Buyer’s legal status (legal 
person = 1; natural person = 0). 
Positive 
Asset characteristics        
Size of the land land_m2 1,005  267,661.5   846,429.4  25 1.16E+07 The size of the land in m
2
. Positive 
Size of the building building_m2 1,080  1,950.9   6,278.5  4 98,439.00 The size of the building in m
2
. Positive 
Sector of activity 











Sector of activity of the original 
SOE to which the asset belongs.  
Ambiguous    Agriculture sector_agri 1,560  0.3   0.5  0 1 
   Services sector_ser 1,560  0.5   0.5  0 1 
   Construction sector_const 1,560  0.02   0.2  0 1 
Location location 1,560  0.7   0.5  0 1 Location of the asset (city = 1; 
village = 0). 
Positive 
Region: 


















   Mitrovica region_mt 1,560  0.2   0.4  0 1 
   Prizren region_pz 1,560  0.2   0.4  0 1 
   Peja region_pe 1,560  0.2   0.4  0 1 
   Gjilan region_gl 1,560  0.2   0.4  0 1 
Election Effects         
Regular elections election_reg 1,560  0.1   0.2  0 1 Election effects: (sale taking 
place two quarters before 
election = 1; otherwise = 0). 
Negative 
Unscheduled election_un 1,560  0.1   0.3  0 1 Non-
elections  significant 
Identifying 
Variable 
        
Prequalification of 
bidders 
preq_bidders 1,551 0.9 0.3 0 1 Requirements for bidders’ 
prequalification (Yes = 1; No = 
0). 
 




TABLE 2: Determinants of asset prices 
Dependent variable:  









All assets except 
land only 
(Buildings only + 
Mixed assets) 
Auction related variables:     
Ln sales experience -0.062 -1.085*** -0.285 -0.373 
(sales_exp) (0.851) (0.387) (0.492) (0.276) 
Ln sales duration -0.041 -0.127* -0.251 -0.121** 
(sales_duration) (0.081) (0.073) (0.200) (0.059) 
Ln number of bidders 0.796*** 0.629*** 0.644*** 0.683*** 
(bidders) (0.071) (0.082) (0.112) (0.056) 
Ln deposit requirement 0.535*** 0.629*** 0.492*** 0.629*** 
(deposit) (0.110) (0.081) (0.138) (0.068) 
Preliminary injunction  -0.723*** -0.744 -0.938*** 
(Yes = 1) (prel_inj)   (0.212) (0.754) (0.278) 
Agency related variables:     
PAK vs. KTA (PAK in  0.950*** 0.589 -0.551 -0.017 
charge = 1) (pak_vs_kta) (0.197) (0.432) (0.636) (0.361) 
NewCos (new companies = 1) -0.107 0.104 0.545 0.342* 
(mode_newco) (0.251) (0.253) (0.412) -0.203 
Asset under rent (Yes = 1) 0.159 0.065 0.216 0.117 
(asset_rent) (0.199) (0.108) (0.222) (0.096) 
Buyer characteristics:     
Buyer origin (foreign = 1) 0.476** 0.662** 0.563 0.666** 
(buyer_origin) (0.230) (0.287) (0.976) (0.276) 
Buyer entity (legal entity = 1) 0.165 -0.096 0.154 0.070 
(buyer_entity) (0.142) (0.143) (0.161) (0.089) 
Asset characteristics:     
Ln size of land 0.250***  0.083  
(land_m2) (0.075)  (0.067)  
Ln size of buildings   0.414*** 0.304*** 0.357*** 
(build_m2)   (0.070) (0.077) (0.037) 
Sector 2: agriculture -0.184 -0.810*** -0.141 -0.454** 
(Base group: manufacturing) 
(sector_agri) (0.164) (0.200) (0.335) (0.216) 
Sector 3: trade and services -1.617*** -0.250** 0.232 0.041 
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(Base group: manufacturing) 
(sector_ser) (0.535) (0.114) (0.481) (0.314) 
Sector 4: construction -1.226* 0.651*** 0.964 0.429 
(Base group: manufacturing) 
(sector_const) (0.695) (0.149) (0.660) (0.423) 
Location (city = 1) 0.490** 0.921*** 0.716** 0.643*** 
(location) (0.213) (0.334) (0.330) (0.193) 
Region 2: Mitrovica 1.819*** 1.520*** 1.692*** 2.277*** 
(Base group: Prishtina) 
(region_mt) (0.241) (0.435) (0.243) (0.446) 
Region 3: Prizren 0.774 -0.334 -0.331 0.144 
(Base group: Prishtina) 
(region_pz) (0.477) (0.266) (0.422) (0.450) 
Region 4: Peja 2.240*** -0.282** 0.387 0.792*** 
(Base group: Prishtina) 
(region_pe) (0.776) (0.134) (0.875) (0.185) 
Region 5: Gjilan 3.007*** 0.282 0.051 0.392 
(Base group: Prishtina) 
(region_gl) (0.679) (0.305) (0.681) (0.385) 
Election effects:     
Regular elections -0.085 0.103 0.000 -0.028 
(election_reg) (0.557) (0.378) (0.359) (0.211) 
Unscheduled elections 0.245 -0.224 -0.275 -0.147 
(election_un) (0.230) (0.152) (0.449) (0.128) 
     
Constant 1.862 9.357 6.590 4.766 
 (6.600) (3.166) (4.181) (2.208) 
     
     
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
SOE dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 447 489 500 989 
Clusters (SOEs) 95 110 272 299 
R-squared 0.813 0.827 0.893 0.862 
Ramsey test (Prob>F) 0.722 0.739 0.080 0.249 
Note:  Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses;   




APPENDIX 1: Descriptive statistics for specific ranges of the asset prices 
 Price ranges (€) Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
0 – 50,000 464  23,343  23,338  23,338   202   50,000  
50,001 – 100,000 217  68,866  66,100  66,100   50,010   100,000  
100,001 – 200,000 282  139,128  135,000  135,000   100,001   200,000  
200,001 – 500,000 321  311,356  303,303  303,303   200,008   499,345  
500,001 – 1,000,000 156  689,044  679,499  679,500   501,000   952,779  
1,000,001 – 2,000,000 84 1,347,895  1,305,000 1,305,000  1,000,300   1,955,590  




APPENDIX 3: Determinants of prices for new companies (NewCos) 
Auction related variables  
Ln sales experience -0.357 
(sales_exp) (0.365) 
Ln sales duration 0.215 
(sales_duration) (0.174) 
Ln number of bidders 0.699*** 
(bidders) (0.067) 
Ln deposit requirement 0.760*** 
(deposit) (0.108) 
Preliminary injunction -1.865*** 
(Yes = 1) (prel_inj) (0.468) 
Agency related variables  
PAK vs. KTA (Yes = 1) 1.025*** 
(pak_vs_kta) (0.248) 
Asset under rent (Yes = 1) 0.119 
(asset_rent) (0.156) 
Buyer characteristics  
Buyer origin (foreign = 1) 0.034 
(buyer_origin) (0.290) 
Buyer entity (legal entity = 1) 0.226* 
(buyer_entity) (0.121) 
SOE/asset characteristics  
Size of land 2.09e-07** 
(land_m2) (1.03e-07) 
Size of buildings 7.35e-05*** 
(build_m2) (1.87e-05) 
Squared size of -6.36e-10*** 
buildings (build_m2_sq) (1.95e-10) 
Sector 2: agriculture -0.892*** 
(manufacturing = 1) (sector_agri) (0.100) 
Sector 3: trade and services -0.302 
(manufacturing = 1) (sector_ser) (1.062) 
Sector 4: construction 0.644 
(manufacturing = 1) (sector_const) (0.404) 




Region 2: Mitrovica 1.596*** 
(Prishtina = 1) (region_mt) (0.169) 
Region 3: Prizren 1.103*** 
(Prishtina = 1) (region_pz) (0.321) 
Region 4: Peja -0.013 
(Prishtina = 1) (region_pe) (0.342) 
Region 5: Gjilan -0.089 
(Prishtina = 1) (region_gl) (0.459) 
Election effects  
Regular elections -0.268 
(election_reg) (0.245) 




Year dummies YES 
SOE dummies YES 
Observations 712 
R-squared 0.796 
Clusters (SOEs) 284 
Ramsey test (Prob>F) 0.022 
Note:  Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses;   
Stars correspond to the following significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
